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Abstract 
 Much media attention has recently focused on the extent to which a company, particularly 
large multinationals or those in financial turmoil, are responsible for the actions of their employees 
and their subsidiaries.  The aim of this paper is to examine recent legal decisions in Australia that 
relate to conglomerate accountability with the objective of drawing legal policy implications.  The 
paper takes a case-based methodology to examine from an economic legal perspective the effects of 
conglomerate accountability.  The role of subsidiaries as agents or partners is examined in regards 
to English and Australian law.  The Australian view of the ‘corporate veil’ is discussed which leads 
into a discussion of circumstances where the Australian courts are willing to pierce the corporate 
veil.  Tortious liability is then discussed and as a result a closing analysis is stated in which the 
potential implications for the EU are highlighted.  
 
Key words: conglomerates, Australia, legal policy trends 
 
Introduction 
This paper seeks to continue an investigation into the direction of corporate governance 
mechanisms, specifically analysing the legal framework that is developing in the corporate law 
environment in Australia as a result of a change in the efficient market hypothesis and draw some 
preliminary policy conclusions for the European Union.  The distinction with previous areas of 
analysis is that the legal trends occurring do not personify solely an individual person or group of 
people accountable, but the paper addresses the liability of conglomerate entities and intra company 
liability.  Hence, the research problem that this paper is seeking to address is: How is the law 
developing in the Australian context on conglomerate accountability?  
 
Companies are afforded by the law in Australia the status of a single economic entity, similar 
to the United States, Canada and United Kingdom.  That is to say that they possess their own legal 
identity, typically akin to the rights of a person, and operate under a corporate veil of protection.  
The veil implication is such that the directors and shareholders of a company will not be held 
accountable for their decisions and liability is limited to the company.  Australian law operates under 
a strict doctrine toward ‘piercing the corporate veil’ (see Woolfson1), for a group of companies or 
                                                 
1 Woolfson v Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] 38 P & CR 521 
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‘single economic unit’ (e.g. Walker2; Industrial Equity3).  Although, following the decision of 
Salomon4 and subsequent realisation of an abuse of the separate legal entity rule, the Australian 
judicial system has adopted a wider stance to allocate responsibility and re-distribute power to 
creditors alleviating agency problems (e.g. Spreag5; Gilford Motor Co6; Casuarina7; Briggs8).  
 
Agency and self-direction fit the persona of the efficient market hypothesis, an extension of 
Adam Smith’s invisible hand, which essentially describes government regulation of financial 
intermediaries and companies' financial disclosures as unnecessary and potentially wasteful (Choi 
and Pritchard, 2003).  Choi and Pritchard (2003) also suggest that legal ramifications will be 
incorporated into rent prices, that is, the price of equity.  However, the setting or environment is 
changing as demonstrated by agency risk and in response to corporate governance breaches of 
duties.  Bebchuk and Hamdani (2002) through their analysis of incorporation in the United States, 
argue that the appropriate legal framework is highly influential on the development of a company.  
In the United States legal environment there has been an explosion of corporate accounting scandals 
and related financial irregularities: Enron, WorldCom, Tyco International and Adelphia 
Communications (Coffee, 2004). Accountability for a firm’s financial position has also seen 
legislative development in the United States addressing corporate governance, specifically the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Vinegard, 2003).  Governance mechanisms can reduce default risk by 
mitigating agency costs and monitoring managerial performance and by reducing information 
asymmetry between the firm and the lenders (Bhojraj and Sengupta, 2003). 
 
Equity markets and debt finance are significant factors influencing a company’s ability to 
grow in an industry and across markets (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  However external finance 
places parties in a position of principal/agent. Agency risk exists in the function of the board of 
directors (Bhojraj and Sengupta 2003).  Agency problems have been well documented (e.g. Boot and 
Macey, 2004; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Cotter, Shivdasani 
and Zenner, 1997) and can cause managers to shirk and expropriate minority shareholders and 
creditors (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), take actions that maximize short-term returns rather than 
long-term returns (DeAngelo and Rice, 1983; Dechow and Sloan, 1991; Murphy and Zimmerman, 
1993), and make potentially unprofitable investments in order to increase firm size and, possibly, 
total compensation (Murphy, 1985; Jensen, 1986). 
 
Agency problems are further exacerbated by mergers and acquisitions of companies.  
Mergers, takeovers and tender offers are a significant shaper of the twenty-first century corporation 
(Bowman and Singh, 1990; John and Ofek, 1995). In recent years, there has been an increase in 
mergers and acquisitions (LoPucki, 2003), although reconsideration occurred regarding 
diversification strategies.  Zuckerman (2000), investigated de-diversification strategies through the 
1980’s and 1990’s of public firms which again showed support of a decrease in diversified business 
units across industries.  Strategic refocusing (see Bigley and Wiersema, 2002) has emerged as a 
principal means by which managers can enhance their firm's market value (see Stewart and 
Glassman, 1988; Lichtenberg, 1992; Markides, 1992; Comment and Jarrell, 1995) although there 
exists an emerging trend of consolidation through bankruptcy (see LoPucki, 2003).  
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3 Industrial Equity v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 
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This widening stance has strong implications to a market that has developed as a result of 
equity and more significantly debt financing, and through various levels of acquisition.  The 
emerging trend in Australian corporate law has four main areas where precedent is being set for the 
lifting of the veil of incorporation.  These are in relation to a subsidiary acting as an agent or partner, 
a derivative benefit from one company to its conglomerate, providing creditors with an identifiable 
entity and the tortious liability of a single economic unit.  
 
Subsidiaries as Agents or Partners 
English Law 
Three dominant decisions: SSK 9, DHN 10 and Adams11 in the English courts indicate the 
precedent set for the Australian Courts for the application of the separate legal entity doctrine for a 
group of companies or single economic unit.  In SSK six requirements were to be established before 
finding that a subsidiary carried on business as an agent or partner for its holding company.  The 
central theme of these requirements was the operation of dependence between the bodies corporate 
and central body corporate.  The decision in DHN qualifies the dependence by stating, ‘The group is 
virtually the same as a partnership in which all the three companies are partners’.  Similarly, DHN 
provided a further contextual component by stating that, ‘The courts must look at the reality of the 
situation’. 
 
 
 
 
Australian Interpretation of English Law 
The Australian courts have followed the English law.  Dennis Wilcox12, applied SSK and it 
was held that the business was not carried on jointly with respect to the transaction in question. 
Furthermore, Mario Piraino13 applied the decision in DHN, ‘…in DHN the disturbance was to the 
parent company…this was not the case here’, the implication from the statement was that there was 
no dependence between the two bodies.  Overall it did not adhere to the elements laid out in SSK.  
 
Australian Law 
Two decisions in Australia’s highest court the High Court of Australia (High Court) have 
developed the Australian approach to parent companies in apparent partnerships, Walker14 and IE15.  
In both cases the High Court held that each of the companies within a group should be regarded as a 
separate and independent legal entity.  Walker was applied in the recent case of Goozee16 and it was 
held that the dividends payed by each subsidiary and not paid by the holding body indicated the 
operation of a separate entity.  Similarly Walker was applied in Linton17  where it was held that a 
separate entity existed as, ‘A benefit to one of them from a transaction would not have derivative 
benefits for the other as shareholder in the first company’.  
 
Walker and IE were also applied in Pioneer Concrete Services18, in which it was stated that 
the separate legal personality of a company is to be disregarded only if the court can see that there is, 
                                                 
9 Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corporation [1939] All ER 116 
10 DHN Food Distributors Ltd v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [1976] Al ER 462 
11 Adams v Cape Industries plc (1990) BCLC 479 
12 Dennis Wilcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267 
13 Mario Piraino Ltd v Roads Corporation (No 2) [1993] 1 VR 130 
14 Walker v Wimborne (1976) 137 CLR 1 
15 Industrial Equity Ltd v Blackburn (1977) 137 CLR 567 
16 Goozee v Graphic World Group Holdings Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 534 
17 Linton v Telnet Pty Ltd (1999) 30 ACSR 465 
18 Pioneer Concrete Services Ltd v Yelnah Pty Ltd (1986) 11 ACLR 108 
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in fact or law, a partnership between companies in a group. Similarly, the decision of Spreag19 
exemplifies the piercing of the corporate veil in agent relationships.  In Spreag the court held that 
there was at least by analogy, a position of an agent acting for an undisclosed principle and the veil 
should be lifted.  Despite the decisions of the courts in Australia there is still a reluctance to lift the 
veil.  It is the approach of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Qintex20 that best indicates the 
reserved nature of the Australian courts.  From an external perspective Qintex was clearly hiding 
behind the corporate veil doctrine: which applied, but the decision by of the court was founded on 
the principles of contract.  The court did however overtly express a need for law reform for 
conglomerate entities. 
 
The breakdown of the veil of incorporation as it applies to conglomerates can further be 
broken down to the analysis of the general operation of all the bodies corporate.  The extension is the 
application of showing a specific derivative benefit of one company in a group, benefits the other 
companies in its group (see Equiticorp Finance21).  Furthermore in Linton the court also indicated 
that the definition of a benefit does not have to be a share based benefit. 
 
Derivative Based Group of Companies 
Australian courts also indicate that there have been instances where, albeit reluctantly, they 
have chosen to go behind the corporate veil for single economic entities or groups of companies 
relating to derivative benefits.  Essentially, since the legal relationship between a holding company 
and its wholly owned subsidiary arises from the beneficial ownership by the holding company of all 
the issued share capital of the subsidiary (Murphy, 1998), this has necessitated a re-thinking of the 
entity based approach to the corporate governance.  Walker established the principle that directors of 
associated companies owed separate duties to act in the best interests of each company.   
 
There is an inclination of reluctance to lift the corporate veil, however in situations where it 
is deemed that subsidiary companies are deriving some benefit, courts have shown a willingness to 
pierce the veil (Ramsay and Stapledon, 2003). One particular instance is where there is deemed to be 
benefit for the whole group.  In the case of Equiticorp Finance, the New South Wales Court of 
Appeal further recognised that in some circumstances a transaction that is entered into for the benefit 
of one or more companies in the group can have derivative benefits for other companies in the 
group.  The willingness of the Australian courts to pierce the veil in relation to derivative benefits for 
companies is in two dominant circumstances: moving targets and consolidated financial statements. 
 
Moving Targets 
Creditors involved with groups of companies have often come up against immense 
difficulties when seeking to identify the correct entity.  As previously stated, redistributing power to 
creditors has provided justification for the piercing of the corporate veil.  Fairness to creditors has 
been highlighted as a premise for judicial divergence from the Salomon principle, particularly in 
cases of insolvency.  In Qintex, the court spoke of fairness when he stated that, ‘Creditors of failed 
companies encounter difficulty when they have to select from among moving targets’.  This means 
by deduction the target is the holding company. 
 
Consolidated Financial Statements 
Moving towards an internal analysis of an entity in a conglomerate the production of 
financial statements and reporting has lead to some piercing of the corporate veil.  Under Australian 
accounting standards, ‘A company that is a chief entity must prepare consolidated financial 
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20 Qintex Australia Finance Ltd v Schroders Australia Ltd (1990) 3 ACSR 267 
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statements for the financial year of the economic entity constituted by the company and all the 
entities it controls’ (Lipton and Herzberg, 2003) which has been supported in the case of Dean-
Wilcocks22.  Overall, the Australian Courts have been willing to lift the veil where to apply 
Salomon’s principle strictly would lead to injustice, inconvenience or damage. 
 
Tortious Liability 
Piercing the veil for tortious liability has developed on the basis of negligence. The case law 
however is yet to provide any precedent utilising a universal test.  It has been shown that factors 
such as control of the board and of the actions of the subsidiary company are significant but not 
absolute.  In a wider sense however courts are trying make determinations that are consistent with 
the precedent as well as workable with and mindful of contemporary commercial practice.   
 
The leading case for piercing the veil under a negligent act for a conglomerate is that of 
Briggs.  In Briggs, the court noted that the law pays scant regard to the commercial reality that every 
holding company has the potential to, and often exercises complete control over a subsidiary.  The 
court also emphasised the need for the High Court to alleviate the consequences of the decision in 
Salomon so as to adapt the principle of limited liability to the economic realities of today.  The court 
further stated that a plaintiff is entitled to bring an action against two defendants if it has evidence to 
establish a prima facie case against one of the defendants.  Subsequently this rule has been applied, 
in both Fletcher23 by Justice Studdert and Green24.  A connection was found between conglomerate 
bodies in the former however there was no connection found in the latter.  
 
The perspective of negligent liability beyond the veil is shown in CSR25. Here it was shown 
that any position above general labour and any but the most trivial financial decisions and 
authorisations came directly from CSR.  Although no argument was raised that the corporate veil be 
lifted, it effectively was and the net result was virtually the same as if it had been; CSR was held 
liable, and the ostensible employer in AP was effectively brushed aside.  The decision in CSR was 
applied and followed by EM Baldwin26, whereby the element of foreseeability by the principle body 
was shown to exist. 
 
Similarly, in CSR & Another27, the court was willing to lift the corporate veil to move 
towards a tortious responsibility of the complimentary bodies.  More conclusively, this analysis 
denoted the formulation of a possible test: ‘Whether the dominant parent in all the circumstances, 
including that the dominance may have been such that the subsidiary was in truth “merely a conduit 
for the parent”, was in a relationship of proximity to the injured party?’.  In reaching the decision the 
court considered factors such as the influence over and power of the principal to control its 
subsidiary as well as day-to-day operation and the general approaches taken by employees and 
managers of the organisations.  If it were held so then the courts were happy to pierce the corporate 
veil and hold the principal liable.   
 
The two important points regarding lifting the corporate veil for tortious actions are, firstly: 
control of the subsidiaries vital organs is important, but that control must extend beyond a typical 
commercial arrangement and amount to a situation where the role of the subsidiary as an entity in its 
own right is diminished to virtually nothing.  Secondly, failing a completely impotent subsidiary 
                                                 
22 Dean-Wilcocks v Soluable Hydroponics  Pty Ltd v Anor (1994) 24 ACSR 79 
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25 CSR Limited v Wren (1997) 44 NSWLR 463 
26 EM Baldwin & Son Pty Ltd v Plane (1998) 17 NSWCCR 434 
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company, where it is clear that the principal is in reality the employer, courts may hold it directly 
responsible under the principles of negligence; while not necessarily ‘lifting the veil’, the same 
outcome will be achieved.   
 
Closing Analysis and Potential Implications for the European Union 
The ability to remove the veil of incorporation is construed hard against the nature of the 
Australian judicial system.  From the early application of Salomon’s principle of separate legal 
entity, to the development of complex business enterprises (particularly in the area of credit), the 
courts in Australia have been forced to adhere to the doctrine of precedent in their decisions as well 
as develop the law so as to sustain a suitable economic climate for commerce.  Legislative 
development has occurred with the implementation of s 187 of the Corporations Law Act (Cth) 
2001, but this section specifies only wholly owned subsidiaries.  It fails to encompass a more 
complete judicial approach to lifting the veil of incorporation for derivative groups and single 
economic entities, agent or partnership company groups or negligent company arrangements.  The 
decision in SSK by Justice Atkinson, which developed the notion of a dependant relationship, best 
governs the allocation of responsibility and onus in any situation.  
 
The implications for the European Union (EU) might be expounded to be positive, such that 
a breakdown of trade and financial barriers supports the pursuit of economic growth.  However, 
when economic growth is sourced through either debt or equity then control mechanisms relating to 
accountability of conglomerates to stakeholders may be negated as a result of the jurisdictional 
barriers inhibiting legal pursuit of a fraudulent company or directors of the company.  The EU has 
focused legislation on trade with respect to tax and finance; furthermore there is legislation in the EU 
concentrating on customs as well. 
 
The anti-fraud office, OLAF, is a body established to investigate fraud within the member 
states as well as external bodies impacting on the EU as an aggregate entity.  The office embodies 
investigations into issues that may affect the financial stability of member states.  However 
investigations have centred on tourism, nuclear safety and physical security.  The emerging business 
domain might also require further consideration as to the accountability of mismanagement by 
conglomerate companies. 
 
Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research 
This working paper has examined the role of conglomerate accountability in the Australian 
legal context.  The role of subsidiaries in terms of Australian and English law was examined which 
highlighted the importance of ‘the corporate veil’ in Australian law.  Legal developments where 
Australian courts were willing to pierce the corporate veil were discussed and potential implications 
for Australian legal policy makers stated.  The international importance of conglomerate 
accountability was also examined in terms of how Australian legal policy can impact EU law and 
vice versa.  Much more research needs to be done to link the international dimensions of Australian 
legal policy with EU legal policy in terms of conglomerate accountability.  Many firms are now 
international and are governed by diverse legal frameworks.  Hence, it is important that potential 
implications of policy changes in individual countries are noted with respect to conglomerate 
accountability.   
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